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Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation
Fleming James, Jr.t
The second Restatement of Torts states that implied assumption of
risk should be recognized as a separate defense.' In a leading article over
sixty years ago, Bohlen 2 took the contrary position. A plaintiff's rea-
sonable assumption of risk would not bar him unless the risk was one
which defendant had a legal right to put up to plaintiff; and in such
a case defendant breached no relevant duty.3 A plaintiff's unreasonable
assumption of risk would constitute contributory negligence on his
part; and this would be a defense without the need to invoke any
separate doctrine.4 Bohlen was the reporter for the original part of
t Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. B. A. 1925, LL.B. 1928, Yale University.
1. REsrAT EN" (SECOND) OF ToRs §§ 496A-496G (1965).
2. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARv. L. Rx. 14, 91 (1905), reprinted in
F. BOHIEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF ToRrs 441 (1926).
3. This is the way I have always read the article. For a different reading, cee Wade.
The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REv. 5, 6 (1961).
Dean Wade concludes that Bohlen had apparently "changed his mind" between the time
of writing the earlier article and the time of his work as Reporter to the first Restatement.
Id. In a footnote Dean Wade concedes, however, that in the earlier article Bohlen took
the position that assumption of risk "negatives the existence of any duty on the defendant's
part by the breach of which he could be a wrongdoer," and states that this was the
principal reason why the doctrine was given no separate treatment in the Restatement. Id.
n.10.
4. This statement, which was mine, not Bohlen's, is an oversimplification. Where
defendant's conduct is wilful or wranton, or entails strict liability, ordinary contributory
negligence is not a defense, but the deliberate and voluntary assumption of an unreason-
able risk may be. See, e.g., RESTrMENr (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 402A, comment n. § 496A.
comment d (1965); W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAiw OF Toms 454, 455 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as PROssER, Tom---the edition will be noted]. In such a situation there
will be need to distinguish what may be called the unreasonable assumption of riLk
from ordinary contributory negligence.
Under a rule of proportional or comparative negligence, the question will arise whefler
the unreasonable assumption of a risk constitutes a complete defense or vhether damages
are to be apportioned. Different answers have been given to this question. See, eg., Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 62 et seq. (1943) (describing the situation under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act both before and after the 1939 amendment which
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the first Restatement of Torts, which reflected his view by giving no
separate treatment to the doctrine of assumed risk.6
Bohlen's analysis has never been universally accepted. Some courts
and commentators continued to talk about assumption of risk as though
it constituted a separate defense; 6 and in the closing sections of the
first Restatement, after Bohlen had left the helm, 7 assumption of risk
was introduced in Section 893.8
Harper and I have always been inclined to accept, in the main,
Bohlen's analysis,9 as our textbook on torts shows.'0 In the decade which
followed that book's publication in 1956 there came to be substantial
abolishes the defense of assumption of risk); Baird v. Cornelius, 12 Wis. 2d 284, 107
N.W.2d 278 (1961); McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113
N.W.2d 14 (1962). The better view is clearly that such assumption of risk is a form of
contributory negligence to be compared with defendant's breach of duty. PRossER,
TORTS 455 (3d ed. 1964); RErSTATEMNIENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496A, comment d, illustration
3, at 564.
This article will not be concerned with the unreasonable assumption of a risk.
5. See note 3 supra. Cf. Malone, Foreward-The Kid Who Got Left Out, 22 LA. L. REv.
1 (1961).
6. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Shell Oil Co., 234 F.2d 733 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 925
(1956); Morton v. California Sports Car Club, 163 Cal. App. 2d 685, 329 P.2d 967
(1958); Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt. 429, 35 A.2d 439 (1944); R. Keeton, Assumption
of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122 (1961); R. Keeton, Assumption
of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965); Note, 26 TENN. L. REv. 565 (1959).
The progression of Dean W. L. Prosser's ideas is interesting. In the first edition of his
Handbook of the Law of Torts he seemed to accept the Bohlen analysis pretty completely.
PROSSER, ToitTs § 51 (1st ed. 1941). His second edition contains no substantial change in
treatment but does expressly take note of my position that the doctrine serves no useful
purposes since it introduces nothing which is not fully covered either by the idea of
absence of duty or by that of contributory negligence. Prosser comments: "This is no
doubt true; but the term does serve to focus attention upon the element of consent to
take a chance, or of voluntary acceptance of a known risk, which is sometimes, but not
always, involved in both of the other ideas." Id. 305 (2d ed. 1955).
In his third edition, Prosser develops at some length the position which is reflected In
the second Restatement. PROSSER, TORTS § 67 (3d ed. 1964). As I see it this position differs
from the one taken in Harper and James principally in two respects: (1) It stresses the need
to distinguish the unreasonable assumption of a risk from ordinary contributory negli-
gence in some situations. Id. 451-52. This point is well taken. See note 4 supra. (2) It
maintains that the voluntary but reasonable assumption of a known risk is a defense to
an action based on defendant's negligence even where that negligence consists in the
breach of a duty not to confront the plaintiff with the very risk which injures him. Id.
451-54. This is the bone of contention between us and the subject of the present article.
7. See 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS vi-viii (1939).
8. Voluntary Exposure to Risk as a Defense:
A person who knows that another has created a danger or is doing a dangerous act
or that the land or chattels of another are dangerous, and who nevertheless chooses
to enter upon or to remain within or permit his things to remain within the areni
of risk is not entitled to recover for harm unintentionally caused to him or his
things by the other's conduct or by the condition of the premises, except where the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty to him or to a third person and has
created a situation in which it is reasonably necessary to undergo a risk in order to
protect a right or avert a harm.
9. F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 130, 131 (1933); James, Assumption
of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
10. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAw OF TORTS ch. xxi (1956).
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judicial" and scholarly 2 support for the point of view it espoused,
namely, that the doctrine deserves no separate existence (except for
11. The leading case is Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.. 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d
90 (1959). Here plaintiff, an invitee, was injured when he fell on the ice in defendant'
skating rink. The evidence tended to show negligence in letting skaters of ordinary abilit)
skate on ice which was unusually hard and brittle, hence dangerous to one without
unusual skill. Defendant had a verdict at the trial. The judge had charged the jury on
the defense of assumption of risk. The appellate division found this instruction confusing
and this, with other errors, was held to call for a reversal. Meistrich v. Casino Arena
Attractions, Inc., 54 N.J. Super. 25, 148 A.2d 199 (1959). The supreme court affirmed thisjudgment with modifications. It construed the charge as declaring "that assumption of
risk may be found if plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the ri-k. not-
withstanding that a reasonably prudent man would have continued in the face of the
risk." 31 N.J. at 48, 155 A.2d at 92. The court found the instruction, as so construed, to be
erroneous. In doing so it adopted substantially the reasoning set forth in the first pa.ra-
graph of this article. If the risk is produced by defendant's breac of duty to plaintiff.
then plaintiff is not barred by encountering it knowingly and voluntarily if a reasonlably
prudent man would have incurred the risk despite that knowledge. See 31 N.J. at 53., 155
A.2d at 95.
This decision was reaffirmed in McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272. 196
A.2d 238 (1963). In a per curiam opinion the court said: "In Meistrith .... we pointed
out that assumption of risk was theretofore used in two incongruous senses: in one ense
it meant the defendant was not negligent, while in its other sense it meant the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent. We said that in truth there are but two issues--negligence and
contributory negligence-both to be resolved by the standard of the reasonably prudent
man, and that it was erroneous to suggest to the jury that assumption of risk was still
another issue." 41 NJ. at 274, 196 A.2d at 239-40. The opinion ended with these strong
words: "Experience . . . indicates the term 'assumption of risk' is so apt to create mist
that it is better banished from the scene. We hope we have heard the last of it. Henceforth
let us stay with 'negligence' and 'contributory negligence."' 41 N.J. at 276, 196 A.2d at
240-41. The clarity of thought which results when assumption of risk is eliminated and
reasoning is confined to the issues of duty (negligence) and contributory negligence is
illustrated in Totten v. Gruzen, 52 NJ. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968).
Other cases are Frelick v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n of Del.. 51 Del. 568. 571. 150 A.2d
17, 19 (Super. Ct. 1959) (plaintiff injured by dangerous condition of preuSs: "In this
type of case, where a risk has been created by a bread of duty toward the plaintiff, the
problem of voluntary assumption of risk overlaps the contributory negligence problem, or
rather, is a phase of that problem"); Blatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd., 419 lawaii I. 15. 406
'.2d 887, 895 (1955) (plaintiff injured by defect caused to auto by repairman; court
direted on new trial to charge on ontributory, negligene but to make no separate sub-
mission of assumption of risk issue: "[W]e join the growing number of courts vhich
decline to permit-reliance on both of these defenses where one would serve"); Baltimore
County v. State, Use of Keenan, 282 Md. 850. 193 A.2d 80 (1963) (guest-host auto case in
which parties had been drinking together. Plaintiff's judgment reversed for failure to
charge on contributory negligence but not for failure to charge on assumption of risk.
which is here the same issue); Feigner v. Anderson, 875 Mich. 23. 13 N.W.2d 136 (1965)
(hunting accident; separate existence of assumption of risk in Michigan traced and
rejected except for master-servant and express assumption); Bolduc v. Crain. 104 N.H. 163.
166-67, 181 A.2d 641, 644 (1962) (bystander helping to prepare horse-pulling event at fair,
failure to charge assumption of risk upheld because not applicable on facts and also
because doctrine entitled to no existence separate frohn contributor%, negligence); Ritter
v. Beals, 225 Ore. 504, 558 P.2d 1080 (1961) (employee not under workinen's compensation
not barred by assumption of risk of obvious condition unless negligent in encountering
risk); Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962) (emplo)ee does
not assume risk unless negligent); McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis.
2d 374, 378, 113 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1962) (guest.host auto case in which parties had been
drinking together; guest's implied assumption of risk "is no longer a defense separate from
contributory negligence'); Colson v. Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387. 113 N.W.2d 21 (1962) (farm
laborer does not assume risk unless negligent); See also Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1962).
12. See, e.g., P. Keeton, Assumptibn of Risk and the Landowner. 22 LA. L Rnv. 103
(1961); Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, id. 17; Wade, The Place ol
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express assumption of risk) and is simply a confusing way of stating
certain no-duty rules or, where there has been a breach of duty toward
plaintiff, simply one kind of contributory negligence.
In the course of the discussion of the second Restatement, the Re-
porter proposed to the advisors the adoption of new sections which
would refine Section 893 of the first Restatement. What happened is
well told by Justice Greenhill in Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc.:
In preparing Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second, the advisers
sharply divided. A group mainly of distinguished deans and pro-
fessors, favored striking the entire chapter of Assumption of Risk.
They would use contributory negligence. The group includes
Deans Page Keeton and Wade, and Professors James, Malone,
Morris, Seavey and Thurman. Mr. Eldredge prepared a "dissent"
for this group. The group is referred to in the notes to the draft
as "The Confederacy." Others including Prosser, Professor Robert
Keeton, and Judges Fee, Flood, Traynor and Goodrich supported
the existence of the defense of assumed risk. The distinguished
scholars refer to the debate, among themselves, as "The Battle
of the Wilderness." The Reporter, Prosser, states in the draft that
the American Law Institute Council voted unanimously to follow
the recommendations of the sections on assumption of the risk.1"
The upshot was adoption by the American Law Institute of Sections
496A-496G of the second Restatement.4
By far the most serious difference between these sections and my
position concerns the question whether a defendant who has breached
his duty of care toward plaintiff may nevertheless defend an action for
injury resulting to plaintiff from that breach on the ground that plain-
Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, id. 5. Cf. Green, Assumed Risk as a Delense.
id. 77; Pedrick, Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk, id. 90.
13. 871 S.W.2d 368, 378 n.3 (Tex. 1963). See also City of Tucson v. Holiday, 8 Ariz.
App. 10, 411 P.2d 183, 188 (1966).
14. Section 496A states the general principle that plaintiff's voluntary assumption
of a risk arising from defendant's negligent or reckless conduct bars his recovery for
harm resulting from that risk.
Section 496B deals with express assumption of risk.
Section 496C states that a plaintiff who fully understands a risk caused by defendant's
conduct, or the condition of defendant's land or chattels, "and who nevertheless voluntarily
chooses to enter or remain . . . within the area of that risk, under circumstances that
manifest his willingness to accept it," is barred from recovery "for harm within that risk."
The section also covers plaintiff's things, but it excepts situations where express assump-
tion of risk "would be invalid as contrary to public policy."
Section 496D makes plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation of the risk conditions to the
doctrine's application.
Section 496E requires that the assumption be voluntary. See note 15 infra.
Section 496F deals with the assumption of a risk created by defendant's breach of statute.
Section 496G states that if defendant "would otherwise be subject to liability to tle
plaintiff," defendant has the burden of proving plaintiff's assumption of risk. See also
pp. 195-96 infra.
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tiff reasonably but voluntarily encountered that risk. The Restate-
ment and its adherents concede that most of the situations enumerated
in Boblen's original article'5 and in Harper and James0 do not involve
the voluntary assumption of a risk. These are cases in which defendant's
wrong may be said to restrict unduly plaintiffs freedom of choice
or to put him under a kind of duress;17 in them a plaintiff will not be
barred simply because he knowingly incurs the risk' s (unless his con-
duct is unreasonable under the circumstances). On the other hand,
where injury comes from use of defendant's land or chattels, there are
(as all concede) large though diminishing areas wherein defendant's
only duty to plaintiff is one of care to acquaint him with risks inherent
in the land or chattel. Here no duty is owed to such a plaintiff who
encounters the condition with full knowledge of its risks, however
carefully he does so. And here again both sides are in agreement.10
15. See Bohlen, supra note 2, 20 HAv. L. REv. at 19-21, SUDIES IN *TE L,,w or Torrs
at 447-50.
16. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmrs, LAw or TORTs 1165-68 (1956) (list adapted from Bohlen).
This list enumerates: the use of a highway by a traveler, use of public utility premises by
a patron; use of an improperly impeded access to plaintiff's own property cases vhere
defendant's wrong injures plaintiff where he has a right to be without regard to defen-
dant's consent; where plaintiff moves to a nuisance; and where plaintiff is injured in
rescuing a third person endangered by defendant's negligence.
17. See R. Keeton, supra note 6, 22 LA. L. REv. 122, 154-59; PRossER, Tours 465-63 (3d
ed. 1964).
18. RESTATEmEr (SEcoND) Or Toms § 496E(2) (1965) provides that "plaintiff's acceptance
of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's tortious conduct has left him no reasonable
alternative course of conduct in order to
(a) avert harm to himself or another, or
(b) exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to
deprive him."
Cf. id. § 4960(1), comment a.
See also R. Keeton, supra note 6, 22 LA. L. REv. 122, 154-59; PRoss.R, Toms 465-63
(3d ed. 1964).
The second Restatement takes the view that if defendant's conduct leaves plaintiff a
reasonable and safe alternative, plaintiff assumes the risk of the alternative made dangerous
by defendant's tortious conduct even where that conduct faces the plaintiff with a choice
which defendant had no right to impose. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) or TomRs § 496E, com-
ment d 9: illustrations 7, 8, 9 (1965). The comment states that if plaintiff "acts unreasonably
in making his choice, he may be barred from recovery either by his assumption of risk or
by his contributory negligence in failing to exercse reasonable care for his own safety."
Apparently the reasonable choice of the more dangerous alternative will not bar recover)'.
The illustrations are unilluminating on this point, but the apparent meaning of the
comment's text is fortified by a passage and a note in the Reporter's treatise. "(Nwhere a
reasonable alternative is left open ... [plaintiff's] unreasonable insistence upon unneces-
sarily encountering danger becomes contributory negligence; and under one name or the
other the choice of a dangerous highway . .. will bar his recovery. In this area it is
reasonably clear that assumption of risk and contributory negligence always coincide, and
that it is relatively unimportant which the defense is called." Possm, Tours 467-6 (3d
ed. 1964). "The existence of a reasonable alternative does not necessarily make the
plaintiff's choice unreasonable. It depends upon the apparent danger. Willetts v. Butler
Township, 1940, 141 Pa. Super. 394, 15 A.2d 392." Id. 468 n.56.
19. R sTATEMNENT (SEcoND) or Toms § 4960, comment d (1965); PRossm, Toms 451 (3d
ed. 1964).
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The difference between the Restatement view and that taken here
is significant only in that narrow area in which defendant's wrong
"does not cause the plaintiff's choice to be made under duress, '20 but
in which defendant does not have the right to withhold or condition
the plaintiff's use of land or chattels or the other terms of a mutually
voluntary association. A hypothetical case posed by Keeton illustrates
the difference. Black and Blue "are persons to whom the purchaser
of a defectively designed motorcycle lends it, after discovering the
defect and with full warning to Black but not to Blue, the plaintiffs
having need of a vehicle and reasonably choosing to take this, the only
vehicle available."2' Both Keeton and I would no doubt agree that
Black would not recover against the lender for injury caused by the
defect. Under prevailing law the lender has fully discharged his duty
to Black; 22 alternatively the result might be described in terms of
Black's assumption of risk. But Keeton, and presumably the Restate-
ment,23 would also bar Black's recovery against the maker even where
Black's knowing acceptance of the risk was reasonable and even where
the maker's duty to a foreseeable user of the motorcycle was not satis-
fied by warning.24
The latter result, it is submitted, is unfortunate. The maker has,
by hypothesis, put out a product which is unreasonably dangerous
even to one who knows of the defect. Whether he is held strictly or
only for negligence, why should he be freed of liability merely because
the plaintiff knew of the defect but used the thing carefully? If the
individualism embodied in assumption of risk is to be justified by the
unwillingness to inhibit the maker's activities in such a way as to di-
minish or defeat the flow of advantages to plaintiff's class (customers and
users), then surely it is unrealistic to think that in the case put the
withholding of liability will materially promote that objective.2 5 The
maker, negligent by hypothesis, will be subject to liability to plaintiffs
ignorant of the risk, and if the fear of this liability does not keep
him from producing the product, it is unlikely indeed that he will go
out of production to avoid the prospect of additional liability to the
occasional informed victim. Except where products are extremely dan-
20. R. Keeton, supra note 6, 22 LA. L. Rav. 122, 156.
21. Id. 157.
22. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JA-MEs, LAw OF TORTS 1163-64, 1181 (1956). But ef. Pfaffenbach
v. White Plains Express Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 132, 135-36, 269 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116-17, 216
N.E.2d 324, 325 (1966).
23. RMESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRis § 496C, comments e, I & g (1965).
24. R. Keeton, supra note 6, 22 LA. L. Rav. 122, 157-59.
25. See Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. Rav. 17, 67-68 (1961).
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gerous, liability in both instances is more likely to induce care in
manufacture than cessation of production.
Although the difference between the second Restatement position
and mine is a narrow one, its scope is widening and will probably
continue to grow in importance. The two views will produce the same
result wherever the defendant's duty to plaintiff will be fulfilled by
adequate warning. Then if the plaintiff has full knowledge and appre-
ciation of the risks inherent in the condition or the conduct which in-
jures him, he is not hurt by the hazard (ignorance) which underlay
the duty to warn him of these risks.20 The two views will produce
different results only in those situations where defendant's duty to
plaintiff goes beyond mere warning or full disclosure and includes
the taking of some additional precaution for plaintiff's safety. But the
tendency of courts today is to require (or to let a jury require) addi-
tional precautions in many situations where a warning of the danger,
or its obviousness, was held to satisfy defendant's duty of care a genera-
tion ago.
Examples come readily to mind. The traditional view was that an
occupier of land would in most cases satisfy his duty of care to an
invitee by full disclosure of the dangers of his premises.Y Similarly,
the maker of goods had only to acquaint the user of the dangers of
the goods (and he had this duty only when the dangers were not ob-
vious28). Today courts are increasingly reluctant to abide by such rules
of thumb; there is a substantial tendency to recognize that circum-
stances may call for precautions in addition to warning.
20 The second
26. See Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases. 29 mL',. L. Rrv.
61, 83 n.45 (1945); Seavey, Swift & Co. v. Schuster-Liability to One Aware of Danger. 65
HARv. L. Rv. 623, 625-26 (1952). Cf. McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 275.
196 A.2d 238, 240 (1963).
27. This was the position of the first Restatement. See REsrATr-tmrL or Toms §§ 340,
343 (1934).
28. A leading case is Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
29. See 2 F. IARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF Totrs § 27.13 (1956) (criticizing first Restate-
ment position limiting occupier's duty to invitee and citing cases where it was not
followed); id. § 28.5 (criticizing Campo case and citing decisions contrary to it).
Some recent cases dealing with the land occupier's liability for obvious dangers 
are
Cummings v. PFrater, 95 Ariz. 20. 386 P.2d 27 (1963) (modern anal)sis used: obvious
condition found not unreasonably dangerous); Murphy v. El Dorado Bowl. Inc., 2 Ariz.
App. 341, 409 P.2d 57 (1965) (jury could find obvious condition unreasonably dangerous
under circumstances); Chance v. Lairy's, Inc., 58 Cal. 2d 368. 24 Cal. Rep. 209. 374 P.2d
185 (1962) (whether duty to give specific warning or take other precaution with reference
to open and obvious planter box in foyer likely to become crowded with patrons, held
for jury). See also P. Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obuions Condi-
tions, 100 U. PA. L. R-y. 629 (1952); PRosSER., ToRTs 404 (3d ed. 1964) C'ln any case where
the occupier, as a reasonable man, should anticipate an unreasonable risk of harm to the
invitee notwithstanding his knowledge, warning, or the obvious nature of the condition,
something more in the way of precautions may be required').
Some recent cases dealing with a maker's liability for obvious defects in his product are
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 78: 185, 1968
Restatement itself adopts the newer view in these cases, though
guardedly. 30
The adoption of this view represents a judgment that the dangers
of the premises or the product are unreasonable ones even to those
who are fully aware of them. Thus, if the maker of an appliance with
obvious and exposed moving parts is held to the duty to equip it with
some safety appliance, then the law no longer accepts the user's
ability to take care of himself as an adequate safeguard of interests
which society seeks to protect; the law has put some of the burden
of looking out for the plaintiff on the defendant. If now the law should
relieve the defendant from liability for breach of that duty because
plaintiff encountered the unreasonable danger voluntarily but care-
fully, then indeed the law would defeat itself. It would be applying
a doctrine born of the notion that an actor owes no duty of affirmative
care for the protection of others to a situation in which the law hasimposed just such a duty. The increasing judicial rejection of the
assumption of risk doctrine reflects a recognition that this defense is
inconsistent with newer policies which underlie the imposition of aduty to take care of others that extends beyond merely warning them.
As we have seen, this repudiation has attained substantial proportions
during recent years.
There was of course some judicial authority to support the Restate-
ment position and a great deal of loose judicial laniguage which could
be construed to support it. If all this is lumped together it may wellhave represented the weight of authority when the Institute adopted
Sections 496A-496G. On the other hand, if carefully read, many of the
cases cited do not actually support the Restatement position to the
extent that it differs from that taken here. Thus Section 496C, Com-
ment g, which states that plaintiff's assumption of risk may bar himfrom recovering for injuries caused by defendant's negligence toward
Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (rmodern analysis used;obvious condition held not unreasonably dangerous, four judges dissenting): Megstna v.Clark Equipment Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959) (discussion and applicatIon of Campocase, Clark, J., dissenting); Brandon *. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 342 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1965)(verdict holding maker liable for lack of guards on forklift upheld, two judges dissenting),Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 81, 207 A.2d 314, 320 (1965) (purZhaser's kinowl-edge of defect does nbt necessarily preclude maker's causal negligence). Cf. Campbell v.Siever, 253 Minn. 257, 91 N.W.2d 474 (1958); Totten v. Gruten, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1(1968).See also Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Ptoduet,71 YALE L.J. 816, 83641 (1962); Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence As ToDesign, Instructions or Warning, 19 Sw. L.J. 43, 46-47 (1961).30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toirrs § 343A, & comments & illustrations (1966); id.Appendix 233-35 (1966) (Reporter's Notes) (dealing with occupier's liability for obviousdangers); id. § 389 & comments d, e & f.
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him even though "plaintiff's conduct may be entirely reasonable under
the circumstances," is followed by Illustration 1, which supposes that
A is illegally and dangerously setting off fireworks on his land near a
highway, thereby endangering people on the highway. B, fully aware
of the risk, stands nearby to watch the spectacle and is injured by a
defective rocket. The illustration concludes: "B may be found to have
assumed the risk." This illustration is said to be "based on Scanlon
v. Wedger."31 Although the illustration does not specify that B was
in the exercise of reasonable care, no doubt that is implied by the con-
text. Moreover, it was stated in the report in Wedger that the plaintiffs
"'were in the exercise of due care." 32 But the illustration departs
radically from the decision in a most significant respect. In Wedger
the jury made a special finding that defendant in firing the bomb ex-
ercised reasonable care and found for the defendant3 3 The court up-
held this verdict saying that the voluntary spectator must be held to
consent to the display "and he suffers no legal wrong if accidentally
injured without negligence on anyone's part, although the show was
unauthorized. He takes the risk."
34
Johnson v. City of New York,35 another case cited by the Restate-
ment, is similar. A willing spectator at an automobile race was not
allowed to take advantage of its mere illegality when she participated
in that illegality (obstruction of the highway). But the court said, this
holding "does not preclude a recovery .. . if the injury to her was
caused by the misconduct or fault of the defendants."
30
In each of these cases defendant's conduct was illegal because its
authorization by local authority contravened a statute, not because it
involved the risk of unreasonable harm to plaintiff-not, that is, be-
cause it involved any breach of the duty of care toward plaintiff. This
31. 156 Mass. 462, 31 N.E. 642 (1892). See RESrATmENr (SEcoND) or Toirrs § 496C
(1965); id. Appendix 414 (1966) (Reporters Notes); cf. id., § 496A. illustration 1; id.
Appendix 411 (1966).
32. 156 Afass. at 463, 31 N.E. at 642.
33. 156 Mass. at 462, 31 N.E. at 642.
34. 156 Mass. at 464, 31 N.E. at 642.
35. 186 N.Y. 139, 78 N.E. 715 (1906).
36. 186 N.Y. at 149, 78 N.E. at 718.
The quoted passage occurs in this context: the court had pointed out that the acts of
the defendant though "illegal -vere illegal as aainst the public and travelers on the
highway, not as against the plaintiff." A hypothetical analogy is then put, after which the
court continues: "as between the plaintiff and these defendants the legality or illegality
of the exhibition given and witnessed, so far as that illegality depends on the obstruction
and appropriation of the highway, was not the material factor. It did not create a liability
against the defendants if they were at fault in the conduct of the race in no other respect.
It does not preclude a recovery by the plaintiff if the injury to her was caused by thc mis-
conduct or fault of the defendants."
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comes a long way from holding that a careful plaintiff assumes the risk
of a defendant's negligence toward him.
The same is true of all but two of the twelve other cases with which
the Reporter invites comparison. The two are Morton v. California
Sports Car Club37 and Shafer v. Tacoma Eastern RailroaPs which
tend, though not unequivocally, to support the Restatement position
on the narrow point in issue. The other cases include some where the
victim was the knowing guest of a drunken driver, so that his own
participation in the risk amounted to more than ordinary contributory
negligence,30 and some golf cases wherein there was clearly no breach of
duty toward plaintiff.40 In the other golf cases cited by the Reporter,
defendant was negligent toward plaintiff, either in playing prematurely
or in failing to shout "fore," and the court held that there was no
assumption of risk.41
Thus, most of the cases cited by the Restatement do not support its
broad assumption of risk doctrine and can more appropriately be
considered in terms of the no-duty analysis proposed here. In a thought-
ful article, Professor Robert Keeton criticizes this no-duty analysis on
the ground that it will introduce confusion because the same act of
the defendant may constitute negligence to one ignorant of its risk and
yet due care to one who knows.4 2 This of course is true, but it is quite
familiar and need give no trouble. The act which is negligent toward
a child may not be so toward an adult; and when an occupier creates a
condition on land he often cannot tell whether it will constitute action-
able negligence until he knows whether it will injure a child or an
adult intruder.
To me all this is less confusing than talk about assumption of risk
37. 163 Cal. App. 2d 685, 329 P.2d 967 (1958).
38. 91 Wash. 164, 157 P. 485 (1916).
39. Mountain v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. App. 2d 333, 234 P.2d 1031 (1951); Bohnsack v.Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 52 N.W.2d 79 (1952). In each of these cases the question was
whether plaintiff's conduct barred him from recovery for defendant's wilful and wanton
misconduct. See note 4 supra.
40. Stober v. Embry, 243 Ky. 117, 47 S.W.2d 921 (1932); Schlengcr v. Weinberg, 107
NJ.L. 130, 150 A. 434 (1930).
41. Everett v. Goodwin, 201 N.C. 734, 161 S.E. 316 (1931); Slotnick v. Cooley, 166 Ten.373, 61 S.W.2d 462 (1933); Alexander v. Wrenn, 158 Va. 486, 164 S.E. 715 (1932).
Also cited are Klinsky v. Hanson Van Winkle Munning Co., 38 N.J. Super. 439, 119A.2d 166 (1955), certification denied, 20 N.J. 534, 120 A.2d 661 (1956); Dusckiewicz v. Carter,115 Vt. 122, 52 A.2d 788 (1947). In both these cases the court held that a jury would be
warranted in imposing upon the proprietor of a place of amusement a duty to take precau-
tions against danger. Assumption of risk was mentioned as applicable where no such duty
existed.
42. R. Keeton, supra note 6, 19 Sw. L.J. 61. The different results for knowing andignorant victims may particularly arise when defendant's conduct occurs long before aninjury, so that defendant could not tell when he acted whether the consequences of his
conduct would at some future time constitute negligence.
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(which invokes so many different images). This is a matter of intellec-
tual aesthetics, however, and I quite agree with Professor Keeton that
the difference in the no-duty cases is essentially a semantic one, that
courts often prefer the language of assumption of risk, and that all of
us should learn to be bilingual. What I fear from his usage is that it
may lead others, as it has led him, 43 to adopt a substantive result that
would bar the knowing but careful plaintiff from recovering for harm
caused by defendant's negligence, thus neutralizing the judgment
(made on the negligence issue) that the situation produced by the
negligence is unreasonably dangerous even to one who has full knowl-
edge of its risks.
Finally, some commentators have argued for retaining a separate
doctrine of assumption of risk because it is recognized as an affirmative
defense to be pleaded and proved by defendant, whereas plaintiff has
the burden to plead and prove defendant's breach of duty toward him;
therefore plaintiffs will benefit from adoption of the assumption of
risk formulation. This ingenious argument calls for several comments:
(1) The argument is valid only if assumption of risk is used strictly
as a correlative of defendant's lack of duty toward plaintiff. If the term
"assumption of risk" could be confined to such cases and if it would
indeed be effective in getting courts to put the pleading and proof
burdens on defendant in those cases, its use might be justified in the
eyes of those who wish to facilitate plaintiff's recovery.
(2) The Restatement rule, however, would extend the substance of
assumption of risk so as to make the reasonable assumption of a risk
a defense to an action based on defendant's negligent creation of that
risk.44 To this extent the rule recognizes a defense where none would
exist under the analysis proposed here. And the raising of an additional
substantive defense cannot possibly be a boon to plaintiff even if the
defendant has the burden of proof on the issue.
(3) A decision to use the term "assumption of risk" to characterize
a no-duty situation (which might be of help to plaintiffs) would not
logically require the recognition of a substantive defense in a situation
where defendant has been negligent toward plaintiff (which could only
disadvantage plaintiffs). There is no reason, therefore, why "the friends
of the plaintiff"4 should accept the bane to get the unrelated boon.
43. L Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. LJ. 61, 68 (1965); f. It. Klmvton.
Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 L4,. L. RE%,. 122, 160.64 (0961).
44. RESTATEME=T (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C, comments e, f & g (1963).
45. PiRossER, TORTS 452 (3d ed. 1964).
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(4) While the assumption of risk formulation is theoretically more
likely to induce courts to put the burden of proof on defendant than
is the no-duty formulation of the same problem, this is not likely to be
the result in practice. Courts rarely lose sight of the duty issue where
burden of proof is concerned, though they may also use the language
of assumption of risk for other purposes. Dean Prosser does give a hypo-
thetical case where the outcome could depend on the theory chosen-
assumption of risk or no-duty: "If... there is a crash of a private air-
plane in which everyone is killed, including a passenger, and it appears
that the plane was defective and the pilot knew it, treating disclosure
to the passenger and his consent as a matter of duty means that he will
lose; but if it is a matter of assumption of risk he will recover."40 But
the sole decision cited to support the proposition 47 involves a plane
crash caused by the pilot's active negligence which was sufficiently
proved by plaintiff's evidence. The case is not an instance where the
choice of theory in a no-duty case actually brought a shift in the burden
of proof, nor are any other cases cited in Dean Prosser's text, nor do I
know of any. The cases he cites48 amply support his statement that
assumption of risk is a defense "which the defendant is required to
plead and prove." But in all of them save one defendant's negligence
toward plaintiff was amply shown and the court was dealing either
with unreasonable assumption of risk 49 or assumption of risk in the
special Restatement sense (i.e., the reasonable assumption of a risk
negligently created).r0 These are not "no-duty" cases.,' In the one
exception the court held that "the plaintiff, upon whom the burden of
non-assumption of the risk rested, has failed to show that he did not
know and appreciate the danger incurred in driving the cattle."62
(5) As suggested in Harper and James, 3 adoption of the no-duty
formulation will not necessarily involve placing on plaintiff the burden
of showing all the facts which would be relevant to show breach of
duty when his evidence suffices to show defendant's unreasonably
46. Id. 453.
47. Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Service, 231 N.C. 181, 56 S.E.2d 560 (1949).
48. PRossER, TORTS 453 n.25 (3d ed. 1964). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS
§ 496G (1965); id. Appendix 419-20 (1966) (Reporter's Notes, citing same cases).
49. That is, the unreasonable assumption of a risk which is a kind of contributory
negligence. See note 4 supra.
50. See note 6 & pp. 188-89 supra.
51. See p. 185 supra.
52. Rosedoff v. Consolidated Rendering Co., 94 N.H. 114, 115, 47 A.2d 574, 575 (1946).
To similar effect is Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt. 429, 35 A.2d 439 (1944). See also RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496G, comments b & c (1965).
53. 2 F. HARPIER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 1190-91 (1956).
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dangerous conduct. Procedural principles are not as rigid and inflexible
as Dean Prosser's argument supposes.54
A trend toward wider compensation of at least innocent victims of
negligent conduct and toward a clarification of tort theory was clearly
discernible in the decade preceding the appearance of the second Re-
statement.55 A reversal of this trend because of the generally deserved
prestige of the Restatement would, I submit, be a minor tragedy.
54. See, e.g., F. JAwEs, CIvIL PROCEDURE §§ 2.9, 4.7, 7.8 (1965).
55. See, e.g., Demarest v. T.C. Bateson Constr. Co., 370 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1967) (N.M.
law); City of Tucson v. Holliday, 3 Ariz. App. 10, 411 P.2d 183 (1966); Halepeska v.
Caflihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.V.2d 368 (rex. 1963).
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